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ABSTRACT
Objective To evaluate the effectiveness of anonymised
information sharing to prevent injury related to violence.
Design Experimental study and time series analysis of a
prototype community partnership between the health
service, police, and local government partners designed
to prevent violence.
Setting Cardiff, Wales, and 14 comparison cities
designated “most similar” by the Home Office in England
and Wales.
Intervention After a 33 month development period,
anonymised data relevant to violence prevention (precise
violence location, time, days, andweapons) frompatients
attending emergency departments in Cardiff and
reporting injury from violence were shared over
51 months with police and local authority partners and
used to target resources for violence prevention.
Main outcome measures Health service records of
hospital admissions related to violence and police
records of woundings and less serious assaults in Cardiff
and other cities after adjustment for potential
confounders.
Results Information sharing and usewere associatedwith
a substantial and significant reduction in hospital
admissions related to violence. In the intervention city
(Cardiff) rates fell from seven to five a month per 100000
population comparedwith an increase from five to eight in
comparison cities (adjusted incidence rate ratio 0.58,
95% confidence interval 0.49 to 0.69). Average rate of
woundings recorded by the police changed from 54 to 82
amonth per 100000 population in Cardiff compared with
an increase from 54 to 114 in comparison cities (adjusted
incidence rate ratio 0.68, 0.61 to 0.75). There was a
significant increase in less serious assaults recorded by
the police, from 15 to 20 amonth per 100000 population
in Cardiff compared with a decrease from 42 to 33 in
comparison cities (adjusted incidence rate ratio 1.38,
1.13 to 1.70).
Conclusion An information sharing partnership between
health services, police, and local government in Cardiff,
Wales, altered policing and other strategies to prevent
violence based on information collected from patients
treated in emergency departments after injury sustained
in violence. This intervention led to a significant reduction
in violent injury and was associated with an increase in
police recording of minor assaults in Cardiff compared
with similar cities in England and Wales where this
intervention was not implemented.
INTRODUCTION
According to the World Health Organization, in 2004
interpersonal violence resulted in over 600 000 deaths
and around 17.2 million serious injuries throughout
the world.1 In 2002, interpersonal violence (excluding
operations of war and self inflicted injury) was the fifth
most common cause of death worldwide among peo-
ple aged 15-29 and sixth most common among those
aged 30-44. Consequently, WHO has identified inter-
personal violence as a global public health issue. In
2008-9, police recorded over 900 000 violent incidents
in England andWales, representing 1643 violent inci-
dents per 100 000 population; the murder rate was 1.1
per 100 000 population.2 In the United Kingdom,
interpersonal violence in 2003-4 resulted in medical
and lost productivity costs of £2.1bn (€2.3bn; $3.3bn)
and £1.7bn, respectively.3
Efforts at preventingviolence canbe implemented at
individual, relationship, and community levels. As cul-
tures of violence are often developed and reinforced at
the community level,4 prevention strategies imple-
mented at this level can reach large groups of indivi-
duals at risk. There are, however, few scientific
evaluations of violence prevention programmes at
the community level.5
We evaluated a novel community violence preven-
tion programme developed over three years and fully
implemented in 2001 in Cardiff, Wales (population
324 800 in 2001). The theoretical basis of this pro-
gramme is that by enhancing information available
from the police with relevant data from emergency
departments and by including health professionals
responsible for treating the injured as advocates for
prevention, more violence can be prevented than
from police effort alone.
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Beginning in the UK,67 and subsequently in
Scandinavia,8 studies matching data from emergency
departments and police have shown that only a quarter
to one third of violent incidents that result in treatment
in an emergency department appear in police records.
These estimates are consistentwith the findings of large
scale national crime surveys.2 Even the most serious
violence might not be known to the police. In the Uni-
ted States, for example, 13% of shootings resulting in
emergency department care in Atlanta, GA, were not
included in city-wide police records.9 Reasons for low
police ascertainment include reliance on victims to
report offences, fear of reprisals, not knowing the iden-
tity of assailants, few incentives to report, and unwill-
ingness of victims to have their conduct scrutinised.2 10
Findings in theUK to this effect persuaded the govern-
ment to adopt a multi-agency approach to violence
prevention, which includes the health sector. Building
on the prototype partnership described below, the UK
1998Crime andDisorder Act placed a legal obligation
on police, local government, and the National Health
Service (NHS) to collaborate to develop and imple-
ment joint crime reduction strategies. This legislation
led to the formation of more than 350 local statutory
partnerships by 2000.
Although laws in some countries andUS states man-
date the reporting by medical staff of some violent
offences that result in treatment, knowledge of these
is generally low and, for various reasons, many physi-
cians choose not to report. In one study, the introduc-
tion of mandatory reporting of domestic violence did
not increase reporting.11 Moreover, the motivation for
such legislation has been improvement of services for
victims and increasing detection of offenders rather
than to inform and drive violence prevention at the
community level.12 International comparisons have
shown that only a proportion of all violent offences
are reported to the police and that only a proportion
that are reported result in police recording. For exam-
ple, in a comparison of violence affecting adults (aged
over 16) in 1999 in eight Western countries, reporting
rates varied from 24% in theNetherlands to 52% in the
US and recording rates for those reported varied from
20% in Switzerland to 82% in the US.13
Violence prevention efforts can be enhanced by col-
laboration between public health and the police. For
example, epidemiological data on the time, circum-
stances, and location of homicides in Cali, Colombia,
have been used to inform allocation of police resources
and state and city regulations, resulting in a 30%
decrease in homicide, representing about 600 fewer
violent deaths between 1994 and 1997.14 In South
Africa, a collaboration between public health orien-
tated research groups led to the establishment of a
nationwide violence and injury surveillance system
that has been used to inform police crime information
systems.15 In the US, the National Violent Death
Reporting System links health and law enforcement
data.16 There is also convincing evidence from rando-
mised experiments17 18 and in a systematic review for
the Campbell Collaboration that targeted policing can
be effective in reducing crime and disorder.19 Evalua-
tions have concluded that violence and other cate-
gories of crime, most of which is spontaneous, are
rarely displaced by police activity; rather, prevention
effects of targeted policing often extend to areas imme-
diately surrounding the location targeted.20 The loca-
tions of concentrations of violence (“hot spots”),
however, change, sometimes rapidly—for example,
in urban night time economies where the number
and locations of premises licensed to sell alcohol vary
over time—which implies that continuous access to
and use of reliable data are important.
We examined the effectiveness of a health led,multi-
agency violence prevention partnership. It was
hypothesised from the start that a partnership between
health and police practitioners and city government
officials working together and using data collected in
emergency departments as well as police intelligence
to inform targeted policing and other strategies, would
prevent violence to a greater extent than city partner-
ships in which emergency departments data are not
collected and used. This hypothesis was the reason
both for setting up the prototype partnership and the
process for data collection and use.21
METHODS
Cardiff Violence Prevention Programme (CVPP)—a data
sharing strategy for violence prevention
In July 1997, a prototype partnership—a multi-agency
violence prevention group made up of representatives
of the city government, police, city licensing regula-
tors, and an emergency department consultant and
chaired by a professor of oral and maxillofacial sur-
gery—was convened to implement this approach in
Cardiff. In time, membership expanded to include
representatives of education, transport and ambulance
services, and local licensees. After careful refinement
in a research and development initiative (the Tackling
Alcohol-related Street Crime project, 1999-2002,
http://kb.keepbritaintidy.org/nighttime/casestudies/
cardiff.pdf) funded by theHomeOffice, particularly of
arrangements to anonymise, share, summarise, and
use data derived from the emergency department,22
the full violence prevention programme became
operational in January 2003. At this point, full data
sharing and use were implemented and the prototype
partnership was formally adopted by the city govern-
ment and its police and health service partners.
Processes for data capture, sharing, and use have
already been published.22 23 In summary, for all
patients reporting injury in a violent incident, informa-
tion about the precise location of the incident (name of
bar, nightclub, school, park, street, etc), time and day,
and type of weapon is captured electronically24 in the
emergency departments by reception staff when
patients first attend, stripped of personal identifiers,
and shared by hospital IT staff on a monthly basis
with the partnership crime analyst. The analyst then
combines data with police intelligence to generate con-
stantly updated maps of violence “hotspots” and sum-
maries of weapon use and violence type (classified as
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“stranger,” “acquaintance,” and “domestic” to fit with
national crime survey categorisation). Integrated vio-
lence prevention is then based on this combined, con-
tinuously updated information.
Uniquely in Cardiff and throughout this study, data
derived from the emergency departments relevant to
targeted violence prevention were combined with
police data and used to deploy prevention resources.
This prototype partnership met about every six weeks
and, based on the combined data, introduced and sus-
tained a range of strategies designed to address specific
risks andpatternsobserved in thedata.These strategies
comprised repeated adjustments to the routes of police
patrols and moving police resources from the suburbs
to the city centre atweekends to ensure that policewere
present and able to intervene at specific locations and
times identified by the data, targeting problematic
licensed premises (by police and city government offi-
cials responsible for alcohol licensing) and informing
public space deployment of closed circuit television
(CCTV).23 Over the course of the intervention period,
the partnership (which became the statutory UK
approach to crime prevention after the Crime andDis-
order Act) initiated and coordinated violence preven-
tion initiatives. Prevention strategies unrelated to
targeted policing were also implemented by the city
government, prompted by the combined data and
other factors such as the need to improve traffic flow
and public transport arrangements. These included
pedestrianising sections of a city centre street where
bars and nightclubs aremainly concentrated (February
2004), mandatory use of plastic glassware in selected
licensed premises (after 2005), and more frequent late
night public transport services (from February 2004).
The unique characteristics of the partnership that were
not present in any otherUKcity partnership during the
period of the evaluationwere the systematic collection,
summary, and use of emergency department data for
violence prevention and the participation of emer-
gency department andmaxillofacial clinicians in statu-
tory partnership meetings. The common attitudes of
trauma specialists and police managers—both respon-
sive, action oriented practitioners—were evident in the
mature partnership.
There were no other major changes in law enforce-
ment or emergency or trauma services in the inter-
vention city during the study period, throughout
which the city was served by the same single emer-
gency department.
Study design
We used an experimental research design to compare
changes in violence in Cardiff, the intervention city,
with changes in violence in the comparison sites—14
cities classified by the Home Office as “most similar.”
Changes were analysed with consistent monthly data,
starting in April 2000 with the appointment of a data
analyst and continuing toMarch2007,when theHome
Office revised its “most similar” city categories. There
were 33 months of observation before the Cardiff pro-
gramme was implemented and 51 months after imple-
mentation. Outcome measures in this study were
violence recorded by the police (subcategorised as
wounding, common assault, and total assault accord-
ing to standarddefinitions, box 1)25 andhospital admis-
sions related to violence, a health services measure of
community violence.26
With regard to police records,Cardiff was compared
with 14 “most similar” cities identified by the UK
Home Office (the lead government department for
police): Birmingham, Bristol, Coventry, Derby,
Leeds, Leicester, Lincoln, Newcastle upon Tyne,
Northampton, Plymouth, Preston, Reading, Sheffield,
and Stoke on Trent. Cities were clustered (k-means)
according to an array of 20 sociodemographic and geo-
graphic factors, which, together, are linked to levels of
crime (box 2).27
Groups of these most similar cities are used by the
UK government as the basis ofmanaging performance
of police forces and statutory partnerships. As these
cities are clustered according to many variables, they
Box 1: Standard definitions of assault types
More serious wounding: Injury resulting in permanent disability or permanent loss of
sensory function; injury that results in more than minor permanent, visible disfigurement;
broken or displaced limbs or bones (including fractured skull); compound fractures,
broken cheek bone, jaw or ribs, etc; injuries that cause substantial loss of blood, usually
necessitating a blood transfusion; injuries resulting in lengthy treatment or incapacity
Less serious wounding: Loss or breaking of tooth or teeth; temporary loss of sensory
functions (including loss of consciousness); extensive or multiple bruising; displaced
broken nose; minor fractures; minor but not merely superficial cuts
Common assault: Grazes; scratches; abrasions; minor bruising; swellings; reddening of
the skin; superficial cuts; a “black eye” as well as . . . assault resulting in no injury
Box 2: Sociodemographic and geographical variables used to cluster most similar cities
Percentage of young men (aged 16-24)
Percentage of minority ethnic population
Percentage of single adult households
Percentage of single parent households
Percentage of student households
Percentage of residents living at a different address one year before the 1991 census
Percentage of local authority housing, plus new town renters and housing associations
Percentage of terraced housing
Percentage of overcrowding
Population sparsity
Population density
Length of A, B, and minor roads per head of population
Motorway junctions per 1000 population
Percentage of daytime population
Percentage of young male claimants of unemployment related benefits
Percentage of long term claimants of unemployment related benefits
Index of overcrowding homogeneity
Population per square kilometre
Percentage of claiming income support
Percentage of claiming family credit
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constitute an appropriate comparison group for our
study. In addition, hospital admission data were avail-
able in Cardiff and in three of the 14most similar cities
(Leeds, Reading, and Sheffield). Attendance data for
emergency departments were also available from Car-
diff but not in sufficient quality from comparison cities
for thismeasure to be included. Because strength of the
police force28 and city unemployment rates29 have
been found to be linked with incidence and recording
of violence, we controlled for both in the model. The
data on unemployment rate reflect the monthly per-
centage of eligible workers aged 16-64 who claimed
unemployment benefits. Police force strength was
characterised as the annual number of officers per
100 000 population.30-37
National crime recording standard (NCRS)
The national crime recording standard, designed to
standardise (previously highly inconsistent) crime
recording by the police was introduced, police force
by police force, across England and Wales between
1999 and 2002, increasing recording rates. This stan-
dard was introduced in the South Wales police force
area (of which Cardiff is a major urban constituent) in
April 2002, resulting in a 25-33% increase in rates of
recorded violence.38 We controlled for implementa-
tion of the standard in the analysis as described below.
Statistical analyses
Time trends in crude assault rates
To compare changes in rates of violence over time, we
comparedCardiff rates, bymonth, with themean rates
of the comparison cities. We compared the actual
assault rate for Cardiff with the 95% confidence inter-
val of themean in the comparison cities to determine if
the Cardiff rate was statistically different from that
mean. The comparison is made for total, common,
and wounding assaults.
Multivariable regression modelling
To control for the effect of the national crime recording
standard and other potential covariates, we estimated
negative binomial regression models with counts of a
given type of violence recorded in each city in each
month as the dependent variable. The negative bino-
mialmodel is similar to a Poisson regressionmodel but
does not impose the Poisson assumption that themean
and variance of the dependent variable are equal. Like-
lihood ratio tests conducted on the models indicated
that the negative binomial model fits the data better
than the Poisson model in each regression presented.
The population of each city is included as a control
variable to account for the different population sizes
and to allow for the interpretation of regression coeffi-
cients as incidence rate ratios. As each city is observed
repeatedly over time, it is also possible to control for
differences across cities that do not vary over time.
Conditional fixed effects negative binomial regression
was estimated in Stata version 10 to control for these
time invariant factors. Separate models were calcu-
lated with all woundings, common assaults, total
assaults (all woundings and commonassaults), andhos-
pital admissions for violence as dependent variables.
The main independent variable in the models is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for all months and cities
where the Cardiff programme was in place (in this
case, solely Cardiff) and equal to 0 for all other places.
This variable allows us to test the association between
violence and the presence of the Cardiff programme.
The model can also provide an estimate of the change
in violence that occurred in Cardiff after the pro-
gramme was implemented, while controlling for the
change in violence in the comparison cities. The coef-
ficient on this variable reflects the difference in rates of
violence in Cardiff after the programme was imple-
mented net of any changes in rates of violence in the
control cities after implementation of the programme.
To control for the overall increase in recording of
violence because of the national crime recording
Table 1 | Unadjusted monthly average counts and population adjusted monthly rates of hospital admissions after violence,
police recorded woundings, and police recorded common assaults in Cardiff and comparison cities before and after
implementation of Cardiff Violence Prevention Programme
Admissions after violence
Police recorded wounding
assaults
Police recorded common
assaults
Cardiff hospital Comparison cities Cardiff Comparison cities Cardiff Comparison cities
Unadjusted count (monthly average)
Before implementation 21.03 21.20 168.52 181.03 47.79 142.65
After implementation 16.89 33.35 256.76 382.48 61.14 110.88
Population adjusted rate of violence (per 100 000 population)
Before implementation 6.71 5.33 53.79 53.86 15.25 42.44
After implementation 5.39 8.39 81.96 113.80 19.51 32.99
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Fig 1 | Total assault rates by month for Cardiff and mean of comparison cities with 95%
confidence intervals
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standard, we introduced a dummy variable coded as 0
for months before implementation and 1 for months
after. Changes in overall violence trends that could
be common across all the cities in the samplewere con-
trolled for by including dummy variables for the calen-
dar year of a given observation. Each model also
controlled for unemployment rates and police force
strength. To test if the impact of the intervention chan-
ged over time, we calculated an identical set of models
with the addition of the Cardiff programme by year
dummy variable interaction terms.
We also performed a parallel set of analyses of hos-
pital admissions for violence from Cardiff and the
three “most similar” cities for which monthly admis-
sions data were available (January 2000 to December
2005). Seventy two months of data (36 before and 36
after implementation of the Cardiff programme) were
available for this outcome.
RESULTS
Table 1 shows the unadjustedmonthly average counts
and population adjusted monthly rates of hospital
admissions and violence recorded by the police after
violence.
Time trends in crude assault rates
For total assaults (fig 1),Cardiff was generally below the
mean of the comparison cities in the period before the
programme, but this difference is often within the con-
fidence interval, especially in the year 2000 and in the
months just before implementation. Both Cardiff and
the comparison cities also showed an upward trend in
total assaults before implementation—reflecting adop-
tion of the national crime recording standard. After
implementation, however, there is a clear divergence
in the two series. Total assaults began to decline inCar-
diff, while they continued to increase in the comparison
cities. Cardiff’s total assault rate was also consistently
outside the confidence interval of the comparison cities
after the programme was implemented.
Figure 2 shows the trends for common assault rates.
For this measure, Cardiff was consistently below the
mean of the comparison cities, though there was
someoverlap in 2003when the programmewas imple-
mented. There was some slight convergence of Cardiff
with the other cities in 2006 and 2007, but Cardiff
rarely fell within the confidence interval.
Figure 3 shows the trends for assaults causing
wounding. For this more serious violence, Cardiff
rarely fell outside the confidence interval of the com-
parison cities in the period before the programme.
After the programme was implemented, however,
Cardiff’s rate began to decline and was consistently
and significantly lower than themean rate for the com-
parison cities over the remainder of the time series.
Taken together, these time series graphs suggest that
there was a substantial reduction in risk for violence in
Cardiff relative to other cities after the programmewas
implemented and that this was because of lower rates
of violence causing wounding rather than less serious
violence. It is still not clear if this difference can be
attributed to the Cardiff programme or if the observed
relation is caused by other confounding factors.
Multivariable regression results
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for violence
recorded by the police and all variables included in
the regression estimation. Over the 84 months of the
study,Cardiff had lower rates of total assaults and com-
mon assaults but similar levels of assaults causing
wounding compared with the other cities. The mean
population of Cardiff is slightly higher than 300 000
and themeanpopulationof comparison cities is similar
(though there is considerable variation across compar-
ison cities). Cardiff had slightly lower unemployment
and somewhat greater police officer numbers per
population over the study period.
Table 3 provides initial regression results for vio-
lence recorded by the police. Results are presented in
terms of adjusted incidence rate ratios, which are the
exponentiated coefficients from the negative binomial
models. The rate ratio for implementation of the Car-
diff programme shows that the average rate of total
assaults after implementation of the programme was
about 79% of the assault rate before implementation.
This reduction is accounted for by a reduction in
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Fig 2 | Common assault rates by month for Cardiff and mean of comparison cities with 95%
confidence intervals
Table 2 | Outcomes and independent variables for Cardiff, comparison cities, and all cities in
study of implementation of Cardiff Violence Prevention Programme. Figures are means (SE)
(over time of study)
Cardiff
(n=84)
Comparison cities*
(n=1140)
All cities
(n=1224)
Monthly average recorded by police:
Total assaults 278 (7) 433 (9) 422 (9)
Common assaults 56 (2) 123 (3) 118 (3)
Wounding assaults 222 (6) 310 (8) 304 (8)
Rate/100 000 population recorded by police:
Total assaults 89 (2) 135 (1) 132 (1)
Common assaults 18 (0.5) 41 (1) 39 (1)
Woundings 71 (2) 94 (1) 92 (1)
Population (thousands) 313 (1) 336 (7) 335 (6)
Unemployment rate 3 (0.03) 3 (0.03) 3 (0.03)
Noofpolice/100000population 471 (2) 419 (2) 422 (2)
*Birmingham, Bristol, Coventry, Derby, Leeds, Leicester, Lincoln, Newcastle upon Tyne, Northampton, Plymouth,
Preston, Reading, Sheffield, Stoke on Trent.
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wounding assaults, which were 68% of the wounding
assault rate before implementation. There was a 38%
increase in the common assault rate associated with
implementation. All of these rate ratios are significant
at P<0.05.
While these results show a strong association
between the implementation of the Cardiff pro-
gramme and a reduction in assaults, they assume that
the effect of the programme is constant over the imple-
mentationperiod.Table 4 shows the results for specific
years as well as the results of regression specification
that allows the intervention effect to vary by interacting
the intervention dummy with the year variables. We
calculated incidence rate ratios by exponentiating the
programme coefficient plus the programme*year coef-
ficient. In 2003 (the reference year), the rate of total
assaults was 93%, and the rate of wounding assaults
was 83% of the rates before the programme. The pro-
gramme was associated with a large increase in com-
mon assaults recorded by the police in 2003 (92%).
After the first year of theCardiff programme, however,
there was a continued decline in all assaults and
wounding assaults for 2004 and this level of assaults
was maintained for subsequent years. For example,
the programme was associated with a total assault
rate of 71% and a wounding assault rate of 64% of the
pre-programme rates in 2004. This level of decline was
maintained through 2007. The increase in common
assaults associated with programme dissipates after
2003. The incidence rate ratio is significantly smaller
in 2004 and 2005 relative to 2003 and was not signifi-
cant overall in 2004, 2005, and 2007. Taken as awhole,
these results suggest that the Cardiff programme was
associated with a larger decrease in assaults after the
first year of programme implementation.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for hospital
admissions. Both Cardiff and the comparison cities
have similar admission rates for violence related
injury. The comparison cities are slightly larger than
Cardiff, and Cardiff has more police per population.
The unemployment rates for Cardiff and comparison
cities are also similar. The regression results (table 6)
show that the programme was associated with a signif-
icant large reduction in the admission rate.
In Cardiff rates of hospital admissions fell from
seven a month per 100 000 population in the
36 months before implementation of the programme
to five a month per 100 000 population in the
36months after implementation, but increased in com-
parison cities from five to eight a month per 100 000
population. While rates of violence recorded by the
police increased across all the study cities, the increase
in Cardiff, from 54 a month per 100 000 population in
the 33 months before implementation to 82 a month
per 100 000 population in the 51months after, was sig-
nificantly less than the increase in the comparison
cities, in which woundings recorded by the police
increased from 54 to 114 a month per 100 000 popula-
tion. Rates of common assaults recorded by the police
in Cardiff increased from 15 to 20 amonth per 100 000
population after implementation compared with a
decrease from42 to 33 amonthper 100 000population
in comparison cities.
DISCUSSION
Introduction of the Cardiff Violence Prevention Pro-
gramme—an anonymised information sharing pro-
gramme to prevent injury related to violence—was
associated with a substantial and significant reduction
in hospital admissions related to violence. Although
violence is increasingly recognised as a public health
problem, community level prevention is often limited
to enforcement strategies to arrest and incarcerate per-
petrators. The programme represents a novel
approach to using relevant available data and expertise
from health and law enforcement professionals work-
ing together in the context of a statutory, local govern-
ment level partnership to develop violence prevention
strategies. The partnership had significant and sus-
tained effects on total assaults and assaults causing
wounding recorded by the police as well as hospital
admissions after violence. These findings show the
potential benefits of data driven violence prevention
partnerships in the community.
The graphs of rates of violence suggest that, after a
period of about two years in which rates in the inter-
vention city and comparison cities diverged, steady
state was reached and differential rates were main-
tained thereafter. This suggests that effectiveness
increased as the partners learned how to process data
efficiently and to deliver prevention based on the com-
bined data and that this learning became embedded in
practice.
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Fig 3 | Wounding assault rates by month, Cardiff and mean of comparison cities. The national
crime recording standard was implemented in Birmingham and Coventry in January 1999, in
Stoke on Trent in October 1999, in Preston in August 2000, in Bristol in October 2000, in
Leeds and Lincoln in February 2002, and in Cardiff, Derby, Leicester, Newcastle upon Tyne,
Northampton, Plymouth, Reading, and Sheffield in April 2002
Table 3 | Adjusted* incidence rate ratios (95% confidence intervals) from negative binomial
fixed effects regression models for total, common, and wounding assaults in Cardiff recorded
by police after implementation of Cardiff Violence Prevention Programme
Total assaults Common assaults Wounding assaults
Programme implemented 0.79 (0.73 to 0.85) 1.38 (1.13 to 1.70) 0.68 (0.61 to 0.75)
Unemployment rate 0.89 (0.86 to 0.92) 0.88 (0.81 to 0.95) 0.89 (0.85 to 0.93)
Police/100 000 population 0.99 (1.00 to 1.00) 0.99 (0.99 to 0.99) 0.99 (1.00 to 1.00)
NCRS reporting system 1.58 (1.52 to 1.65) 1.53 (1.38 to 1.70) 1.20 (1.14 to 1.28)
NCRS=national crime recording standard.
*Regression also controls for calendar month and year (results not shown).
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The cumulativenature of the strategies implemented
by the partnership precludes an assessment of the
unique effects of specific strategies. Trends in violence
and temporal sequencing of the strategies, however,
provide some insights. For example, while rates of
woundings recorded by the police fell significantly
after implementation of the programme, there was a
concurrent increase in common assaults recorded by
the police (that is, those not resulting in injuries). One
plausible explanation for these findings is that more
accurate targeting of hot spots, earlier and more fre-
quent police ascertainment, and better deployment of
public space CCTV led to faster and more frequent
police intervention in assaults and their precursors
(such as arguments). The increased presence of police
at hot spots could also have led to increased reporting
of common assaults by witnesses and victims and sub-
sequent recording by police. These explanations are
consistent with the findings of a controlled study of
the effects of public spaceCCTV; installationwas asso-
ciated with increased police ascertainment of violence
but decreased attendances at an emergency depart-
ment after violence.39 More widely, this explanation
is also consistent with the hypothesis that police inter-
vention in the early stages of an assault can limit the
severity of injury.40 An alternative explanation could
be the greater use of plastic barware. Licensing condi-
tions mandating the use of plastic barware in some city
centre licensed premises, however, were introduced
after the period in which violence in Cardiff and com-
parison cities diverged (that is, 2005, see fig 1) and the
number of glass related assaults was far too low to
account for the observed reductions, indicating that
the glassware change does not explain the divergence.
Overall, however, it is striking that the divergence in
violence rates in Cardiff and comparison cities is clo-
sely associated with the implementation of the mature
data sharing process and the formal adoption by the
city partners of the violence prevention programme,
which had been, hitherto, in a development phase.
Study limitations and strengths
Limitations of the study should be considered when
drawing implications for other communities. Firstly,
the extent to which the decline in assaults, relative to
other cities, can be attributed to the activities of the
partnership is difficult to isolate. While no other
major violence prevention activities occurred in Car-
diff, it remains conceivable that other unmeasured fac-
tors contributed to the effects observed. The
preventive effects, however, were observed after we
controlled for several important potential explanatory
factors, including changes in the national crime record-
ing standard, police service strength, and unemploy-
ment rates. Also, it is possible that other novel
prevention strategies were implemented during the
study period in the comparison cities. Therefore, the
effects observed are potentially weaker than they
would have been if the comparison had been restricted
to cities not implementing any new prevention strate-
gies. Secondly, it is difficult to assess whether the
declines in violence can be attributed to potential vic-
tims avoiding the areas being targeted. For example, an
alternative explanation for the decrease in assaults
could be that people visiting city centres at night
learn to avoid locations that are receiving increased
police attention and move elsewhere. The lower levels
of hospital admissions related to violence, however,
show that even if some displacement of violence did
occur, there was still an overall reduction in serious
injuries. Hospital data, in contrast with police data,
are not, of course, affected by attitudes to police
involvement.21 Thirdly, the generalisability of the
results to specific types of violence is unclear. For
example, victims of domestic violence might not
report violence as the cause of their injury to reception
staff in an emergency department and therefore
domestic violence might not have driven prevention
strategies in proportion to the extent of this problem.
Furthermore, it is possible that cultural and political
differences in the nature of violence within commu-
nities affect the utility of this approach. There may be
barriers to successful community partnerships that
other communities will need to overcome to see simi-
lar benefits. These barriers could include lack of analy-
tical capacity, fears about breaches of confidentiality
(unjustifiable given the non-personal nature of the
data),41 lack of a science based culture in the police ser-
vice, and the lack of a prevention focus in emergency
services. The prevention enterprise described here
depends on sustained and continuous capture, sharing,
and use of data; absence or disruption of any of these
Table 4 | Adjusted* incidence rate ratios (95% confidence
intervals) for specific years after implementation of Cardiff
Violence Prevention Programme from negative binomial
fixed effects regression models for total, common, and
wounding assaults with interaction terms†
Total assaults Common assaults
Wounding
assaults
2003 0.93 (0.84 to 1.02) 1.92 (1.43 to 2.58) 0.83 (0.72 to 0.95)
2004 0.71‡ (0.64 to0.79) 1.16‡ (0.79 to1.52) 0.64‡ (0.54to0.73)
2005 0.77‡ (0.69 to0.85) 1.29‡ (0.90 to1.70) 0.66‡ (0.57to0.76)
2006 0.81‡ (0.73 to0.89) 1.44 (1.03 to 1.84) 0.66‡ (0.57to0.76)
2007 0.72‡ (0.59 to0.85) 1.51 (0.78 to 2.25) 0.58‡ (0.42to0.74)
*Regression also controls for unemployment rate, police force level,
implementation of national crime recording standard, calendar month,
and year (results not shown).
†Interaction terms tested with 2003 as reference.
‡Interaction significantly different from 2003 rate ratio at P<0.05.
Table 5 | Descriptive statistics for analysis of hospital admissions in Cardiff, comparison
cities, and all cities in study of implementation of Cardiff Violence Prevention Programme.
Figures are means (SE)
Cardiff
(n=72)
Comparison cities
(n=276)
All cities
(n=348)
Monthly hospital admissions from assault 19 (0.9) 28 (1.8) 26 (1.4)
Monthly admissions rate/100 000 6 (0.3) 6 (0.2) 6 (0.2)
Population (thousands) 312 (0.4) 398 (13.8) 380 (11.1)
Unemployment rate (%) 3 (0.04) 3 (0.04) 3 (0.03)
No of police/100 000 population 467 (2.7) 394 (3.1) 409 (2.9)
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steps is likely to reduce effectiveness. With the neces-
sary resources and support, however, this is likely to be
a viable approach for communities.
Conclusions and policy implications
We concluded that the Cardiff Violence Prevention
Programme is associated with a substantial and sus-
tained reduction in violence related harm, whether
recorded by health services or by the police. This effect
was observed only for violence causing wounding and
not for more minor violence; the intervention was
associated with an estimated 42% fewer woundings
recorded by the police relative to comparison cities
four years after implementation. While other evalua-
tions of violence prevention strategies often focus on
changes in behaviour (such as student reports of fight-
ing) or impacts within a narrow target population, the
outcomes reported here reflect community level
changes in injury sustained in violence.
This data sharing model is currently being imple-
mented in the UK (there is a coalition government
commitment to information sharing by hospitals in
England for violence prevention) and is advocated by
WHO.15 As a public health strategy the model is
intended to be dynamic, interdisciplinary, and com-
prehensive (that is, not dealing only with particular
categories of violence such as gang violence). Commu-
nities could use this partnership approach to identify
gaps in local prevention strategies and to introduce
appropriate programmes and policies based on the
best available evidence. For example, interventions
to improve the social cognitive skills of youth and
family based programmes to enhance parental moni-
toring of youth, as well as community level pro-
grammes such as Ceasefire’s efforts to diffuse
escalating community violence42-44 and boys and girls
clubs’work to provide stable adult mentors45 could be
introduced on this basis.
Our findings suggest that communities can achieve
substantial reductions in the public health burden of
violence through organised data driven partnerships
between health, law enforcement agencies, and local
government. Furthermore, as police ascertainment of
violence that results in injury is limited in all countries
where data matching studies and national crime sur-
veys have been carried out,13 and, reflecting compara-
tively little investment in law enforcement, it is likely to
be even lower in low and middle income countries, it
seems likely that the main conclusions of this study are
generalisable outside the UK.
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